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Irish Political Parties' Attitudes towards Neutrality and the Evolution of the EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policies

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ABSTRACT *This article traces the evolution of attitudes and policies of Irish political parties towards Irish neutrality and the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) across four decades. The article provides conceptual snapshots of the position of parties' policies along two policy dimensions. The first dimension captures policies of limited 'military' neutrality and 'positive'/'active' neutrality. The second dimension captures minimalist EU foreign and security policy, defined as 'civilian' or 'soft' security policy, to a maximalist EU CFSP/ESDP 'hard security' policy amounting to a 'militarized' EU. The positioning starts with the campaign for Irish membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), focusing on the accession negotiations and the 1972 referendum campaign and finishes with an analysis of parties' positions on the Security and Defence Policy aspects of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. Evidence shows the positions of the larger parties of Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Labour Party shifted away from fundamental neutrality to embrace treaty-based progress towards a maximalist EU ESDP. Over the same time period, the smaller parties of Sinn Féin and the Green Party were more consistent in their adherence to positive neutrality and in their opposition to the development of a maximalist EU ESDP. The forces of Europeanization have been evident in influencing evolving party discourses in Ireland. Much of this influence has been occasioned by the impact of participation in government on parties and the sporadic requirement to engage with referendum campaigns. The process of Europeanization has thus been subtle and muted and has interacted in intricate ways with domestic party agendas and objectives.*

Introduction

Foreign, security and defence policy are matters of 'high politics', traditionally perceived as separate from 'domestic' political concerns (such as healthcare, education, employment and taxation) that are broadly accessible to the public through direct experience and ready information. Yet, although neutrality is seldom an electoral issue in Ireland, the topic does influence voter behaviour in referendums on European integration treaties in particular. Smaller parties, especially, may perceive indirect electoral benefits through the adoption of specific foreign, security and

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defence policy positions during referendum campaigns. Indeed, theoretically speaking, there is a growing opportunity for wider party competition in Ireland in the realm of foreign, security and defence policy because the EU has not yet managed to secure ultimate competence in the area. This is an opportune time to examine party positions on neutrality and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy/ European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP). The Lisbon Treaty sets out a legal base for comprehensive EU competence in foreign, security and defence policy, making neutrality and ESDP very significant, live issues in Ireland and across Europe.

In formulating their positions on neutrality and a common foreign, security and defence policy, Irish parties must confront multiple dynamics of the EU's CFSP/ ESDP. First, there are the diverse policy agendas in this field held by governments of fellow member-states, each with distinct historical traditions in matters of war and peace and cultural–domestic concepts of civil–military tenets, and each enjoying varying levels of 'permissive consensus' from public opinion. Each state also has its own important partnerships and relations with other non-EU states and international security and military organizations; in particular, states' positions in relation to the United States of America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) appear to be key dynamics of EU security and defence policy. Political parties confront a second, more serious institutional challenge through the intergovernmental organization of decision-making on CFSP/ESDP. The ESDP agenda is set by the European Council and decisions are taken by member-states through the Council of Ministers, rather than using the 'community method' that involves the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and the European Commission. The two Council bodies 'meet behind closed doors and release the absolute minimum amount of information'(de Rossa, *Dáil Debates* 424: 1851, 3 November 1992). As a result, political parties suffer an acute information deficit in this area of policy and cannot influence policy unless they are in government. A third challenge comes from the changing nature of the EU itself, as it moves from its original 'soft' civilian ethos to the post-Nice extensions into 'hard' military power, along with parallel attempts to achieve a new political, constitutional union (Deighton, 2002: 726). The final dynamic for consideration is the security environment, i.e. the perceived threats to European security and defence and the designation of the appropriate role for the EU in response to such threats. Irish political parties must respond to all these factors in order to form coherent policy positions on neutrality and the EU's CFSP/ESDP.

Europeanization Factors Influencing Party Positions on Neutrality and ESDP

Identifying the evolving positions of all Irish parties on neutrality and the EU's CFSP/ESDP across four decades facilitates consideration of the extent to which a process of 'Europeanization' of Ireland's political parties may be evident. A range of influences, many of them domestic, are notable. They include the party leader's own personal values and preferences, party positioning and identity in terms of -

electoral competition, a party's position in government or on the opposition benches, party membership and the perceived policy preferences of Irish voters. These domestic influences inevitably interact with forces emanating from Europe to produce changes that are compatible with a process of Europeanization (Ladrech, 2002: 396). All of Ireland's political parties have, over time, modified their positions on neutrality and the ESDP. A conceptual matrix comprising two 'discursive' dimensions is used in this article to map the positions of Irish political parties regarding the EU's CFSP/ESDP and Irish neutrality. These dimensions are: (1) limited ('civilian/peacekeeping') to maximalist ('militarized/unlimited action') CFSP/ESDP, and (2) limited ('military') neutrality to maximalist ('positive/ 'active') neutrality. Positions are identified by focusing on the meaning of Irish neutrality, in terms of values and policy content, and the development of ESDP, incorporating the conceptual permutations and boundaries of this new policy area (instead of using a quantitative 'word score' approach that records the frequency of key words in party manifestoes). A conceptual approach helps to flesh out the subtleties involved in the use of the word 'neutrality' in party political discourse and to more accurately reflect parties' policy positions in their political context. The 'discourse' data used to configure party positions on the conceptual matrix are election manifestoes, policy papers, Ardfheiseanna (party conferences), press releases, referendum campaign material and, in particular, discourses and debates in the Houses of the Oireachtas. This overview thus provides a basis for determining the extent to which parties have experienced programmatic change, which is, according to Ladrech (2002) an important indicator of a process of Europeanization. Determining whether or not political parties have been 'Europeanized' with respect to their changed discourse on neutrality and ESDP is dependent on what influenced that change – EU or domestic factors. In this regard, the context within which change occurred is important.

The Context of Party Positions

Divergence of Neutrality Concepts

Although Irish attitudes to European integration are well understood (see Kennedy & Sinnott, 2007), academics, elites and government have argued that public thinking on neutrality is 'extraordinarily ill-defined', that a crystallized meaning of neutrality among the public does not exist (Gilland, 2001: 151) and that public attitudes to neutrality are 'confused' (FitzGerald, 1996) and non-rational (Everts, 2000: 178–179). However, more recent academic research has indicated that the public have consistently adhered to a clear-cut concept of 'active' or 'positive' neutrality. Furthermore, this adherence is 'rational' (Page & Shapiro, 1992: 36, 281) because the concept embodies the core values and beliefs (i.e. independence and identity) of Irish people in international affairs and foreign policy and in relation to the use of military force (Devine, 2008: 480; Keatinge, 1984: 99; Keatinge, 1996: 112–113; Government of Ireland, 1996: 119).

The 2001/2002 Irish Social and Political Attitudes Survey (ISPAS) survey showed that the strongest public support for neutrality is for a concept embodying the following foreign policy goals (Devine, 2008: 471):

- non-involvement in war
- independence
- impartiality
- peace-promotion
- self-defence only
- non-aggression
- not supporting big powers
- making our own decisions
- UN peace-keeping only

An analysis of survey responses gathered in April 1985, May and June 1992, together with the 2001/2002 responses, indicates that this meaning of Irish neutrality is reasonably stable over time (Devine, 2008: 472). This 'fundamental', 'active' or 'positive' concept supported by the public (herein known as 'Irish neutrality') is radically different from the so-called 'military' neutrality concept – amounting to non-membership of a military alliance – that appears in the discourse of the larger political parties such as Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. These 'active' and 'military' neutrality concepts reflect differing foreign policy agendas (see also Keatinge, 1996: 111; 1984: 32, 118–119; McSweeney, 1988: 208; Fanning, 1996: 147), which may explain why parties in government are accused of 'fudging' the issue of neutrality; they are playing what Robert Putnam (1988) calls a 'two-level game', caught between the European Council and Council of Ministers' maximalist ESDP agenda driven by larger states such as France and Germany, and the domestic context of the public's 'active neutrality' agenda.

Compatibility of Neutrality Concepts with ESDP

Twenty-five years ago, Patrick Keatinge (1984: 44) noted, 'the futures posited by the European Community's style of integration and by permanent neutrality are mutually exclusive'. This incompatibility appears to be acknowledged in the Irish public's voting behaviour in referendums: neutrality has been among the top substantive policy reasons for voting against successive treaties furthering defence integration, e.g. the Single European Act (SEA) (Jones, 1987); Maastricht Treaty (Coghlan, 1992); Amsterdam Treaty (Sinnott, 1998a), Nice Treaty (Sinnott, 2001; Jupp, 2002) and the Lisbon Treaty (DFA, 2008: 14). Evidently, a proportion of Irish voters have consistently demonstrated a belief that further EU integration in the area of foreign, security and defence policy is incompatible with the concept of neutrality they support.

There is debate over the compatibility of several elements of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) proposed in the Lisbon Treaty with neutrality. For

example, the Irish government has argued that 'military' neutrality is safeguarded, whilst legal analysts have pointed to some incompatibilities. For example, Hummer (2006: 67, 69) argues that the Article (42[7]) of the Consolidated Treaties amended by the Lisbon Treaty that contains a 'mutual defence clause' (Barroso, 2007) means that 'there remains no doubt that the neutral and non-aligned Member states are under the obligation to mutual (military) assistance in the case of armed attack' and that the solidarity obligations of CSDP are also clearly against neutrality law. Examining the positions of the political parties on neutrality and the ESDP from a legal perspective would indicate that parties may have difficulty in occupying more than one quadrant of the following conceptual matrices.

Party Positions in the 1970s

In the 1970s, the process of Ireland's accession to the then European Economic Community (EEC) raised the issue of Irish neutrality in the context of European common defence. From the outset of the negotiations to join the EEC, there was secrecy about what was agreed, specifically: about what Fianna Fáil had committed Ireland to in relation to neutrality and a future EU defence policy (e.g. Dillon, *Dáil Debates* 196: 3375–3382, 26 July 1962; Browne, *Dáil Debates* 196: 3501–3503, 26 July 1962; Dillon, *Dáil Debates* 198: 1341, 1346, 13 December 1962). For example, Senator Mary Robinson lamented the narrowness of the debate on Ireland's membership of the EEC, dealing with just economic aspects rather than wider political implications (*Seanad Debates* 69: 1292, 11 March 1971). She argued,



Figure 1. Irish parties' positions on neutrality and ESDP – 1970s.

> it would be much stronger to have a genuine policy on neutrality, to state it now, and to state it as part of our commitment to the development of the European Community. This is a matter which should not be neglected. We should know what the intention of the Government is in this area.

A marked feature of this era was the disappearance of the word 'neutrality' from the governing parties' foreign policy discourse. For example, Minister for Foreign Affairs Patrick Hillery stressed Fianna Fáil's view that 'the foreign policy of a small democratic country like ours is not a single, grand design', and that the government 'should not and could not impose an arbitrary and abstract foreign policy' on Ireland's relations with Britain, the European Community, the United Nations and the developing world (*Dáil Debates* 260: 405, 18 April 1972). Hillery also argued that three issues – the assertion of its identity, the recognition of that identity by others, and the promotion and development of exchanges with other nations – are basic aspects of any country's relations with the world (*Dáil Debates* 260: 384). These, he concluded, 'indicate … the general aim and direction of our foreign relations'. Hillery surmised that, 'our foreign relations and our foreign policy should, after all, in the long run, express the character, values and concerns of the Irish people in their dealings with the world' (*Dáil Debates* 260: 406). This new pre-accession discourse departed from past speeches by substituting the word 'identity' for 'neutrality' and they did not elaborate on Irish people's values, character and concerns, although the identity of the state and the people's values have consistently been viewed as being embodied in Irish neutrality (e.g. from Traynor, *Dáil Debates* 125: 1754, 1 May 1951; Cowan, *Dáil Debates* 138: 832–833, 29 April 1953; to Government of Ireland, 1996: 15; Ahern, 1999).

If Fianna Fáil in government were determined to avoid any talk of neutrality, Fine Gael, in government from 1973, wanted to smother any discussion of a future EU defence policy. Although Hillery had always denied offering that Ireland would enter into military commitments during the accession negotiations (*Dáil Debates* 259: 2444–2445, 23 March 1972), as shadow foreign minister in 1970, Garret FitzGerald was clearly uncomfortable with what he perceived Fianna Fáil had given away in pre-accession talks, as well as with any discussion of European defence:

> The Government have failed to understand what is involved as regards political unity and defence … Defence is not in the offing at the present time. It is premature for us to talk about involving ourselves in defence commitments. I accept if this becomes a full political union that the common defence of the Community could become an issue at sometime. I think the government have gone further than was necessary in this respect. (*Dáil Debates* 247: 2009–10, 25 June 1970)

As foreign minister, FitzGerald's policy was that it was 'dangerous and divisive to talk about European defence' (*Irish Times*, 4 July 1975), partly due to fears of damage to EEC-US relations (*Irish Times*, 3 July 1975), thus making talk about

European defence during that era effectively 'taboo' (*Irish Times*, 4 July 1975). Sinnott (1998b: 6) observes that this trend is evident in all Ireland's referendums on European treaties precisely because of the sensitivity of the topic:

> it is usually assumed that neutrality is the great obstacle that, as far as Ireland is concerned, EU treaty changes must surmount or circumvent. This assumption results in much tiptoeing around, both by diplomats in the negotiation process and by politicians in the ratification debates.

Such deliberate silences maintained by the two largest political parties set the parameters of (the lack of) debate on Irish neutrality and EEC defence in the 1970s (and place them at the central point of the relative dimensions on Figure 1).

A second element of the strategy used both by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael during the early 1970s was to differentiate NATO from a future EU military alliance – 'joining NATO and partaking in an eventual European defence arrangement are two entirely different things, and it is Government policy to keep them that way' (*Irish Times*, 4 July 1975). Use of the words 'pre-existing' military alliance distinguished the former (NATO) from the latter. In the 1980s, both parties claimed retrospectively that their *de facto* position at that time was that Ireland's neutrality would be waived in favour of joining a new *sui generis* EU military alliance – separate from NATO or the Western European Union (WEU) – in the future as part of a common security and defence policy; the only policy differences were the conditions under which this would happen. For example, Fianna Fáil in opposition claimed they had consistently followed a policy of being willing to contemplate security and defence integration once socio-economic equalization of regions throughout the EEC had been achieved (Lenihan, *Dáil Debates* 330: 130–31, 20 October 1981). Fine Gael would have Ireland participate in a European Community common defence policy once the EEC had evolved into 'a genuine federation of (sic) confederation, with a common foreign policy' (FitzGerald, *Dáil Debates* 334: 813, 11 May 1982). What was remarkable, given their respective policies of silence on neutrality and ESDP in the 1970s, was that both parties claimed public support for their positions. Two questions are raised with respect to the validity of their claims: did the parties in government put this commitment to an EU defence clearly to the people in 1970, and was it an essential part of the 1972 referendum campaign?

In fact, a third aspect of party policy that complemented the strategy of secrecy surrounding accession negotiations (O'Leary, *Dáil Debates* 230: 989, 26 July 1967; Tully, *Dáil Debates* 230: 1084–1085, 26 July 1967) and the disappearance of neutrality and EEC defence from party political discourse, was an apparent decision to minimize debates on Irish neutrality and the security and defence policy implications of EEC membership during the accession referendum (Curley, 1995; for reasons see Keogh, 1997: pts 23–24). According to media commentators, the issue was not mentioned in the White Paper on the terms of entry and did not play a central role in the referendum debate (Kennedy, *Irish Times*, 11 July

1975). This is confirmed by a number of academic analyses: Karsh (1988: 168–169) notes 'the dismissive attitude of the Irish proponents of EEC membership to the possibility of Ireland's entanglement within the political and military designs of the European Communities', and Hakovirta (1988: 131) surmises 'the question of neutrality was never very important in the arguments presented by the Irish government for EC membership, or even in the Irish EC debate in general'. The 1972 public debate on EEC membership concentrated on the economic implications of membership (Salmon, 1989: 214) whilst political consequences were not explored in any depth (Keatinge, 1973: 36). Hederman (1983: 109, 71, 146–147) indicates that, in public debate on Irish membership, any incompatibility between these goals (of EEC membership and neutrality) was not pressed home to the Irish people.

The 1972 referendum campaign attracted a 71 percent turnout at the polls, with accession to the EEC favoured by 83 percent of votes. With respect to neutrality and ESDP, Keatinge (1984: 28) surmises, 'the decisive vote of the electorate in favour of membership of the European Community is explained by the quantifiable expectations of economic gain rather than by views, one way or another, on neutrality'. The Labour Party was the only large political party to campaign against accession and instead advocated associate membership, mainly on economic grounds of unfavourable terms of accession and perceived neo-colonialism of the EC, but also due to fears regarding Irish neutrality. The party was particularly anxious over the governmental silence on neutrality and future European defence commitments and pressed the Government on the issue, eliciting the reply: 'When the Taoiseach opened the debate, and I think it is clearly stated in the White Paper, he said that there are no military or defence commitments whatsoever in Ireland's acceptance of the Treaties of Rome and Paris. *Our obligations as a member of the Communities will not entail such commitments*' (emphasis added) (Hillery, *Dáil Debates* 259: 2445, 23 March 1972). The government approach – to refer to the lack of military obligations in the text of the treaties and to deny that an agreement was made during the Irish negotiations for EEC membership to cede Irish neutrality for a future common European defence policy – did not dissuade the Labour Party from continuing to protest over what it perceived as the government's relinquishing of sovereignty and neutrality (Cruise O'Brien, *Dáil Debates* 259: 2208–2209, 23 March 1972). After the referendum, the party accepted the electorate's decision, adopted a role of critical participation in the European Community (Keatinge, 1973: 258) and soon after entered into coalition government with Fine Gael.

Irish political parties' foreign policies were formulated by either a small group under the foreign affairs spokesperson, or even the spokesperson alone; most parliamentary members of the larger parties have little or no role in the discussion of foreign policy (Keatinge, 1973: 263). It is clear that the participation of governing party leaders and foreign policy elites in EEC forums influenced Fianna Fáil party discourse. This is compatible with a process of Europeanization, although it did not appear to manifest itself in terms of strained relations within the party (see Ladrech,

2002: 398). It did, however, reflect a movement away from earlier party programmatic positions. Fianna Fáil was in government during Ireland's three attempts to join the EEC; after each round of accession negotiations, party leaders were probably more willing to secretly cede on policies important to the party in order to secure the ultimate goal of membership. This is reflected in the persistent criticism of Fianna Fáil by the opposition parties for allegedly ceding neutrality as a principle of Irish foreign policy.

Party Positions in the 1980s

The 1980s saw the European Economic Community attempt to develop a common position on foreign policy through the development of 'European Political Co-operation'; this dynamic formed the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in the Crotty case to mandate a referendum in Ireland on the SEA in 1986. This era provides opportunities to study the content of the parties' concepts of ESDP and Irish neutrality through the pressures of Ireland's EEC membership and attempts to respond to 'external' foreign policy events such as the Falklands War.

Oscillations in the neutrality concepts of the larger parties, generally coinciding with change in government, reflected some evidence of 'party competition' inducing shifts in parties' positions in the 1980s, indicated by the dotted lines in Figure 2. Once in opposition, each of the larger parties claimed to occupy a more 'fundamental' neutrality position than the party in government, knowingly appealing to the domestic constituency while freed from competing pressures from the European Council.



Figure 2. Irish parties' positions on neutrality and ESDP – 1980s.

Fianna Fáil and Oscillating Concepts of Neutrality

Fianna Fáil continued the tradition established in the 1970s of avoiding reference to the word 'neutrality' whilst in government, e.g. a key speech on defence contained one mention of the word (*Dáil Debates* 327, 11 March 1981). Taoiseach Charles Haughey outlined Fianna Fáil's policy as committing the state politically to the EEC but militarily to the United Nations (UN) (*Dáil Debates* 327: 1395, 11 March 1981). Although he noted that Ireland's UN peacekeeping would be jeopardized if Ireland joined a military alliance, Haughey declared that if the EEC evolved into a full political union, Ireland would accept obligations arising, even if these included defence (*Dáil Debates* 327: 1398, 1396).

Fianna Fáil's long-standing approach of ceding neutrality in favour of European defence appeared to be reversed during the Falklands War. In this case, the party appeared to favour neutrality and reject a common EEC policy. After the escalation of the Falklands dispute (war had not been officially declared), Fianna Fáil, having just regained the reins of power, sought to 'reassert our traditional policy of neutrality', arguing that 'the people of this country are deeply attached to our neutrality, and they are not prepared to see it eroded' (Haughey, *Dáil Debates* 334: 804, 11 May 1982). This recovered 'neutrality' justified Haughey's decision to withdraw EEC sanctions against Argentina, because:

> there were indications that diplomatic and economic pressure was simply viewed as complementary to military action … As a neutral country, we are not prepared to back military action … The Community has no role in the military sphere and it would be better for European unity and solidarity if it were not seen to take actions supportive of or complementary to military action. (*Dáil Debates* 334: 800, 802, 804, 11 May 1982)

Although the rational actor model would assume that Fianna Fáil evaluated the relative value of invoking neutrality in particular circumstances and chose their strategies accordingly, analysts have argued that the decision to exercise 'an independent and sovereign policy' in this case was driven only in small part to enhance support for Haughey's own political survival, and more likely by the effects of core political beliefs of anti-imperialism and nationalism (Tonra, 1996: 149–150).

Nonetheless, speaking against a motion of 'no confidence' a few months later, Haughey avoided using the word 'neutrality' and instead talked of 'our policy … of remaining aloof from military alliances', 'independence in action', having 'our own view of international affairs', being 'committed to the United Nations' and 'the settlement of international disputes by peaceful, political and diplomatic means', and promoting the cause of universal disarmament (*Dáil Debates* 337: 562, 1 July 1982). Under increased political pressure, fending off a second 'no confidence' motion, Haughey refocused on the fundamental concept of neutrality, stating, 'We seek support on the basis of our determination … to defend our tradition and policy of neutrality' (*Dáil Debates* 338: 649, 3 November 1982) and berated Fine Gael for misrepresenting his government's motives in the Falklands affair. In December

1982, Fianna Fáil lost the general election and a coalition of Labour and Fine Gael took office.

In opposition, Fianna Fáil put forward 'a policy of positive neutrality' (Haughey, *Dáil Debates* 359: 1976, 1977–1978, 26 June 1985) during a Dáil debate on the Dooge Report, advocating 'a firm position of principle that we are opposed to defence being discussed by the Community' on the basis that 'the last thing the world needs today is a reinforcement of military blocs or the creation of new ones'. The party rejected the CFSP obligation to be bound to 'common positions in keeping with majority opinion' because 'a common foreign policy is incompatible with our neutrality' (Haughey, *Dáil Debates* 359: 1978). Fianna Fáil also claimed that the SEA posed challenges 'to our neutrality' (Haughey, *Dáil Debates* 370: 1923–1924, 9 December 1986), noting 'a persistent and worrying tendency to try to blur the distinction between the Community and the Western Alliance' (WEU) and attempts to include military aspects of security in European Political Cooperation. On the basis that 'we have reached, perhaps gone beyond, what is strictly compatible with neutrality', Fianna Fáil demanded a declaration that the SEA 'does not and cannot affect our long-established policy of neutrality … and does not affect Ireland's capacity to act or refrain from acting in any way affecting our status of neutrality' (Haughey, *Dáil Debates* 370: 1925). But, back in government three months later, the party supported the SEA and the party leader's discourse reverted to the former policy of 'military neutrality' (Haughey, *Dáil Debates* 371: 2187, 22 April 1987).

Fine Gael and Oscillating Concepts of Neutrality

At the end of the 1970s into the early 1980s, Fine Gael's foreign affairs spokesperson Richie Ryan advocated a policy of fundamental neutrality at all times, regarding neutrality as the cornerstone of Irish foreign policy and arguing against Ireland's participation in a future common European defence (e.g. Ryan, *Dáil Debates* 314: 1943, 31 May 1979; *Irish Times*, 9 January 1981). Fine Gael pointed to the reversal of Fianna Fáil policy on neutrality, arguing that a 'fundamentalist position' on neutrality as espoused by de Valera was overturned by Seán Lemass and Patrick Hillery in their statements committing Ireland to a future common defence force of the EEC (FitzGerald, *Dáil Debates* 327: 1423–1424, 11 March 1981). Fine Gael party discourse during this time contained the supposition that 'fundamental' Irish neutrality is incompatible with a maximalist EU common defence policy.

However, Fine Gael's own fundamentalist position on neutrality was reversed under Garret FitzGerald's leadership of the party and copper-fastened with the appointment of James Dooge as Foreign Minister in 1982. 'Party-government relations' in the framework of a two-level game stands out as a significant factor in Fine Gael's handling of neutrality and the ESDP during this era. For example, the party leader Garret FitzGerald (1988: 29; 1995) expressed personal difficulties in having to remain silent at Council discussions of security and defence in the 1980s; he did so because he felt public opinion was against such discussions and favoured neutrality. The 'organizational change' dynamic may have influenced cabinet government

formation in 1982. As Taoiseach, FitzGerald wanted to have an Irish foreign minister in favour of European defence integration at the Council of Ministers table. To achieve this, he appointed James Dooge as a senator, in order to later appoint him as foreign minister ahead of any elected TD colleagues – specifically, Richie Ryan, who was an obvious candidate for the position but was sidelined ostensibly because of his pro-neutrality stance (Haughey, *Dáil Debates* 330: 119, 20 October 1981).

Under FitzGerald, Fine Gael articulated a narrow concept of 'military neutrality', (conceived in realist 'balance of power' and Cold War contexts (*Dáil Debates* 327: 1424–1425, 11 March 1981)), meaning 'non-participation in a military alliance … not a member of NATO, WEU or any other alliance'. This was primarily due to pressure from public opinion and because staying outside of these military alliances allowed Ireland to play a more useful role in promoting world peace (*Dáil Debates* 327: 1423, 1420). As a foreign policy vehicle, military neutrality facilitated the following 'positive merits' of Irish foreign policy: UN peacekeeping, the 1961 nuclear non proliferation treaty, decolonization initiatives, opposing South African apartheid, accepting refugees, opposing US funding of South American paramilitaries, increasing aid to the Third World, and supporting Palestinian self-determination (*Dáil Debates* 327: 1425–1426).

Labour Party in the 1980s

For the Labour Party, its version of neutrality was neither a pragmatic policy nor a refusal to join a military bloc but a principled stance and active political philosophy that would always be relevant in a world of great power politics (Cluskey, *Dáil Debates* 327: 1402; Quinn, *Dáil Debates* 327: 1440, 1442). This 'active' neutrality, seen as a 'fundamentally held belief' of Irish people and an assertion of independence, implied a total commitment to peace (Quinn, *Dáil Debates* 327: 1441–1442). The Labour Party positioned itself as having the longest and deepest commitment to neutrality (Cluskey, *Dáil Debates* 327: 1402).

The party differed from Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael in seeing neutrality as non-negotiable and wanting to ensure the EEC understood that Ireland would not give up neutrality for a common defence policy (placing it in the bottom left-hand quadrant of Figures 1 and 2). Neutrality was the primary objective of Irish foreign policy, over and above arriving at a common position or engaging in cooperation with other EEC members that might compromise, in particular, a neutral Irish position in relation to armaments, development and relations with the Third World. For Labour, 'Ireland neutral, positively pursuing its policy of neutrality at the United Nations and within the EEC – both at the Council of Ministers' level and at the technical level of European political co-operation – has a positive contribution to make, if we have the guts to make it' (Quinn, *Dáil Debates* 327: 1445–1446). The Labour Party further distinguished itself from the larger parties by arguing that neutrality should be affirmed permanently by amendment of the constitution (Quinn, *Dáil Debates* 327: 1440). The issue of neutrality exemplified tensions in 'party-government relations' arising from a process of Europeanization, e.g. when in government, the

Labour leadership supported ratification of the SEA whilst the party's rank and file opposed it on the grounds that its provisions posed a threat to Irish neutrality (Moxon-Browne, 1999: 5). The party withstood the tensions, but later modified and clarified its position on Europe and EU foreign policy in ways which would minimize the potential for future internal difficulties. It was argued that participation in government and the closer engagement with the EU which this implied effectively obliged the Labour Party to countenance and implement programmatic change.

Party Positions in the 1990s

Against the background of the end of the Cold War, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that proposed the 'eventual framing' of a common defence policy; this was revised further in the 'progressive framing' of the policy under the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. The latter introduced a CFSP 'policy unit' infrastructure, a new post of High Representative for CFSP, a deeper relationship with the WEU military alliance with provisions for future integration into the EU (the WEU–EU merger was subsequently initiated by a European Council decision at Helsinki in 1999), a new decision-making mechanism to avoid possible vetoes on proposed EU actions through abstention, and a remit of 'Petersberg tasks', including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Taken together, these provisions signalled the material intent of the new political entity called the European Union to achieve a common foreign policy, coupled with a so-called 'crisis management' military bite. In Ireland, neutrality and EU defence policy issues started to show signs of politicization, mainly due to the activities of interest groups. Following from the 1995 McKenna judgement and 1998 Referendum Act, a



Figure 3. Irish parties' positions on neutrality and ESDP – 1990s.

newly-created Referendum Commission was charged with the task of providing information on both sides of the debate in the Treaty of Amsterdam referendum campaign.

Oscillations between concepts of 'military' and 'active' neutrality plus accusations of secrecy over European defence policy continued to characterize large parties' behaviour upon leaving office. For example, Fine Gael accused the Fianna Fáil government of being committed to hiding the reality of discussions at an EU level on new security arrangements (*Beyond Neutrality*, 2006: 6). In opposition, Fianna Fáil assumed the mantle of 'chief architect and defender of neutrality' (*Irish Times*, 16 April 1997) and promised to hold a referendum on membership of NATO's Partnership for Peace – 'seen by other countries as a gratuitous signal that Ireland is moving away from its neutrality and towards gradual incorporation into NATO and WEU in due course' (*Irish Times*, 29 March 1996). But within months of returning to power, Fianna Fáil led the government in joining Partnership for Peace in 1999, without a referendum.

In the meantime, Ireland's first White Paper on Foreign Policy (Government of Ireland, 1996) produced by the 'Rainbow Coalition' government had belied the tension between the Labour Party's 'fundamental' neutrality discourse ('the values that underlie Ireland's policy of neutrality have therefore informed almost every aspect of our foreign policy', Government of Ireland, 1996: 119) and Fine Gael's narrow concept of 'military' neutrality ('Many have come to regard neutrality as a touchstone of our entire approach to international relations, eventhough [sic], in reality, much of our policy is not dependent on our non-membership of a military alliance', Government of Ireland, 1996: 51). With respect to positions on ESDP, the Rainbow Coalition's White Paper (1996: 120, 139) rejected full membership of the Western European Union and the assumption of its mutual defence clause noting it 'would not be compatible with an intention to remain neutral' (1996: 120), but committed Ireland to participation in the Petersberg tasks in the area of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

The smaller parties started to make their mark in Irish politics in the 1990s: Green Party representation went from one to two TDs in 1997 whilst two Member of European Parliament (MEP) seats were gained and subsequently retained until 2004 (see Bolleyer & Panke, 2009). Sinn Féin won a Dáil seat in 1997 and two MEPs in 2004 (see Maillot, 2009). Sinn Féin and the Greens promoted themselves as alternatives to the larger political parties based on their defence of Irish neutrality. For example, Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams (Sinn Féin Ard Fheis, Dublin, 8 May 1999) argued that 'the question of neutrality underscores the importance of providing voters with Sinn Féin as an option in elections and in grass roots political activity', and the Green Party (1997 manifesto) took over the Labour Party's call to enshrine the principle of neutrality in the Constitution (hence both parties are positioned in the bottom left-hand quadrant of the matrix in Figure 3).

A significant Europeanization dynamic emerged in Ireland in the 1990s with the increased politicization of the neutrality/ESDP issue, namely in the form of changes in ideological distance separating political parties and the emergence of

European-centred dimensions of party competition (Mair, 2000: 30). This process of politicization of the EU by political parties was mostly confined to referendum periods, with little evidence of parties competing on EU issues during elections. Nevertheless, the u-turn by Fianna Fáil on Partnership for Peace membership and Fine Gael's shift to a less forthright position (one of silent hostility) on neutrality show the political calculations made by the two largest parties in attempts to differentiate themselves along this increasingly important European-centred policy dimension during referendum campaigns. Similarly, Sinn Féin highlighted its adherence to positive or 'active' neutrality given the vacuum left by the drift of rival left-wing parties, Labour and Democratic Left, towards maximalist ESDP.

EU Referendums

Referendums tend to force political parties to indicate policy positions through a decision to campaign for or against a treaty. On 8 June 1992, a week after the Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty, Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour and the Progressive Democrats came together to call for a Yes vote in the Maastricht Treaty referendum. Particularly notable is the move of Labour from opposition in 1972, to a split in 1987, to advocating a Yes in 1992 but allowing conscientious objection (Franklin, Marsh & McLaren, 1994: 465). Moxon-Browne (1999: 7) argues that the elite leadership drove the policy change. The Green Party, Sinn Féin, the Workers' Party and the new Democratic Left campaigned against the treaty and its CFSP provisions. The referendum was carried with 68.7 percent in favour, based on a turnout of 57.3 percent.

Democratic Left shifted its position by the time of the May 1998 referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty, joining Labour, Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats in advocating a Yes vote. De Rossa's turnaround – from demanding a renegotiation of the Single European Act (*Dáil Debates* 371: 2127, 9 April 1987) and campaigning for a No vote on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to support for the Amsterdam Treaty – was premised on the argument that the prospect of EU militarization had been abandoned (*Irish Times*, 5 May 1998). After Democratic Left merged with Labour in January 1999, De Rossa had apparently become convinced by the need for an EU CFSP and called for a redefinition of neutrality to enable Ireland's full participation in it (*Irish Times*, 30 March 1999). This exemplifies the ways in which party elites involved in negotiations of the treaty at the European level appeared to adopt a cabinet-type responsibility to ensure ratification, regardless of clashes with party policy or the need to reverse previous policy positions.

The Amsterdam Treaty provisions on a potential WEU–EU merger prompted the Fianna Fáil-led government to promise a referendum in Ireland if 'the issue [of European defence] should arise in the future' (Ahern, 1998). The larger parties viewed Amsterdam's Petersberg tasks as 'consistent with the tradition of military neutrality' (Ahern, 2000). Based on support for 'active' neutrality, the Greens were against the tasks which they interpreted as allowing unlimited EU military action and marking a shift in Irish foreign policy away from UN peacekeeping (*Irish*

Times, 27 January 1998). The smaller parties of Sinn Féin, the Green Party and the Socialist Party campaigned against the treaty partly due to perceived negative implications for Irish neutrality. In doing so, they appeared to represent a significant constituency, because 'neutrality' was the top substantive policy reason for voting 'no' in the referendum (just behind 'lack of information'), according to a *Prime Time*/Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ) Exit Poll (22 May 1998).

Policy Changes

Fine Gael fought the 1994 European Parliament elections on a platform of 'full membership of the WEU', but subsequently retreated from what was seen as a 'foolhardy position' (*Irish Times*, 12 June 1995) – although the party continued to put forward motions for full membership of the WEU at Ardfheiseanna (*Irish Times*, 20 March 1996). The party's *Beyond Neutrality* (Fine Gael, 2000: 5) policy document declared, 'Ireland must now define the circumstances in which it would be willing to depart from neutrality and take part in an EU defence entity' and sought to have the WEU's article V mutual defence clause (enshrining a guarantee to automatically afford 'all the military and other aid and assistance' at member-states' disposal to a member-state suffering an attack) into a protocol instead of a full treaty provision in the next EU Treaty so that it would be invoked on a case-by-case basis rather than apply automatically to all states. This shift in programmatic content arguably provides evidence of Europeanization effects on party elite given that a majority of party members favoured the retention of neutrality (Marsh, 2002: 161).

Fianna Fáil in government refused to offer their position on a future European defence policy prior to the summit on the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 – it simply noted that the draft document did not involve Ireland in a mutual defence commitment or membership in a military alliance (Haughey, *Dáil Debates* 413: 1384–1186, 28 November 1991). In opposition, however, the party favoured an EU common defence policy in their 1995 foreign policy document but rejected within this any obligation to come to the aid of another member under attack (*Irish Times*, 7 November 1995), thereby preserving the option of a somewhat credible 'military' neutrality discourse.

Party Positions in the 2000s

In the 2000s, the EU enlarged to include 12 new members. The experience of war in the Balkans led to an agreement by the European Council on November 2000 to create a 60,000-strong European Rapid Reaction Force for crisis-management operations outside the EU; this was subsequently revised in November 2004 into 13 1,500-strong Battlegroups to carry out the Petersberg tasks, giving material effect to the EU's ESDP. The Irish government pledged 850 troops to the Battlegroups, and joined the Nordic Battlegroup in 2008 (with a political limit placed on missions through the 'triple lock' of requiring a UN mandate, government and Dáil approval). The Nice Treaty agreed in December 2000 contained a number of ESDP developments



Figure 4. Irish parties' positions on neutrality and ESDP – 2000s.

including the incorporation of the WEU into the EU, a political and security committee, a military committee and military staff, and 'enhanced cooperation' in CFSP. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA and subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by US-led coalition forces were followed by the creation of new security strategies by the US in 2002 and the EU in 2003. In Ireland, the narrowing gap between Yes and No votes in referendums since Maastricht preceded the failure of the Nice Treaty referendum in June 2001 (with a vote of 53.9 percent against on a relatively low turnout of 35 percent) and was brought about in part by perceived threats to neutrality (Sinnott, 2001: v). The Nice Treaty was ratified by a second referendum in October 2002 (by 62.9 percent on a turnout of 49.5 percent) but the spectre of neutrality returned to haunt the 2008 referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (which was rejected by 53.4 percent on a turnout of 53.1 percent). This final section analyses the divisive role of the issue of neutrality in the referendums on the Nice and Lisbon Treaties.

Nice Referendums

Although Fine Gael had criticized the document as 'one of the weakest negotiating outcomes achieved by an Irish government in the European forum' (Bruton, *Dáil Debates*, 528: 453, 13 December 2000), it and all the larger parties, plus the religious, cultural, business, employer and trade union elite, were in favour of ratification of the Nice Treaty in the June 2001 referendum. With respect to ESDP, the government had claimed a crucial victory in ensuring that closer co-operation could not apply to measures having military or defence implications (Ahern, *Dáil Debates* 528: 450, 452, 13 December 2000). But the threat to Irish neutrality continued to be a primary justification for opposition to treaty ratification by both Sinn Féin and the Green Party, the latter reiterating a 'total rejection of the EU's Petersberg Tasks, the

rapid reaction force established to carry them out and all the military hardware committee structures that have been put in place by the EU' and calling for a protocol in the treaty 'exempting Ireland from involvement in EU military efforts' (Sargent, *Dáil Debates* 528: 461, 13 December 2000).

After the defeat of the 2001 referendum, there were two statements relating to Irish neutrality in the proposal before the people again in October 2002. First, the so-called 'Seville Declarations': statements by the Irish government and EU member-states claiming there was nothing in the treaty that would affect Ireland's 'military' neutrality. Secondly, a new subsection to the proposed Amendment to the Constitution: 'The State shall not adopt a decision taken by the European Council to establish a common defence … where that common defence would include the state' (Article 29.4.9). The Declarations and the new amendment did not address the publicly-supported concept of 'active' neutrality but rather applied the narrowest concept of 'military' neutrality, i.e. non-membership of a pre-existing military alliance such as the WEU or NATO (although the EU's definition of a common or collective defence is 'participation in the defence of Europe under the Treaties of Brussels and Washington which stipulate that in the event of aggression, the signatory states are required to provide assistance'; see http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/collective_defence_en.htm). The issue of divergent concepts of positive/active neutrality and military neutrality highlighted by the Green Party (Boyle, *Dáil Eireann* 554: 401, 11 September 2002) was crucial in understanding the positions of the Yes and No sides in the second referendum campaign. Notably, when pressed to define its own concept of neutrality, Fianna Fáil avoided a direct response, simply admitting that 'we do not have anything like an appropriate definition' (Roche, *Dáil Debates* 554: 413). The Nice Treaty was passed this time (62.9 percent in favour on a turnout of 49.5 percent), aided by the notable (albeit legally spurious) Yes argument that the treaty was necessary for enlargement (to the extent that the government (Ahern, *Dáil Debates* 553: 74, 6 June 2002) and Department of Foreign Affairs (2007: 7) called it 'the Nice Treaty on enlargement').

Party Policy Changes

The most significant policy change announced on behalf of a party was Fine Gael's reported call for the abandonment of Irish neutrality (*Irish Times*, 30 May 2003) prompted by the 2003 re-launch of *Beyond Neutrality*. Certainly, its 2007 election manifesto stated, 'we believe Ireland should be a full participant in an EU security and defence arrangement' (Fine Gael, 2007). Although Fianna Fáil did not outline an explicit position on the matter, party discourse signalled further narrowing of the limited concept of 'military' neutrality. Indeed, the Minister for Defence, Michael Smith, was reported as saying, 'There is no such thing as, if you like, complete military neutrality' (*Irish Times*, 18 January 2003). In the context of the WEU–EU merger and negotiations to place the WEU's Article V mutual defence clause into an 'opt-in' protocol in the new EU Constitution (Convention Report, 20 December 2002: 12), Fianna Fáil reduced the notion of neutrality to one of 'non-membership of military

alliance, and specifically, non-membership of an alliance *with a mutual defence commitment*' (Cowen, *Dáil Debates* 563: 722, 20 March 2003, emphasis added).

From its position of opposition, and supported by the Green Party and the Socialist Party, Sinn Féin took a proposed Private Members' Bill to put neutrality into the Constitution to a second stage in the Dáil (Ó Caoláin, *Dáil Debates* 561: 992, 18 February 2003). Sinn Féin's 'Positive Neutrality in Action' policy document (2004: 15, 9–10) outlines the party's concept of neutrality and argues that: 'there is no legitimate role for the European Union in military and defence matters'. Instead, the party advocates 'UN primacy', specifying that 'International peacekeeping and conflict resolution should happen under the auspices of the United Nations' (2004: 9–10). The document (2004: 10–13) notes the differences between the larger parties' concept of 'military' neutrality and its conception of positive neutrality, encompassing the minimum definition defined in the Hague Conventions and rejecting others' attempts to define neutrality negatively as pacifism, ambivalence and isolationism (2004: 10–11). Positive neutrality includes a guiding 'human security' doctrine, nuclear disarmament, a refusal to get drawn into military conflicts as a result of standing military alliances or mutual defence pacts, active promotion of the primacy of the UN, and a pursuit of (non-military) alliances with other progressive neutral states. Such elements distinguish the party from others and position it in the bottom left-hand corner of the matrix in Figure 4.

Positions on the Constitution/Lisbon Treaty ESDP Provisions

The ESDP provisions in the failed European Constitution (rejected in French and Dutch referendums in 2005) were revived through the Lisbon Treaty agreed in December 2007. The provisions make a commitment to a more assertive EU role in security and defence matters, including solidarity and mutual defence clauses, a common arms policy, Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence, and extensions to the Petersberg tasks (to include conflict prevention, joint disarmament operations and post-conflict stabilization, in part to support third countries in their fight against terrorism). Although Fianna Fáil re-stated their opposition to the EU turning itself into a military alliance (*Irish Times*, 18 January 2003) and whilst in opposition (Ahern, *Dáil Debates* 473: 608, 19 December 1996) and in government (Andrews, *Dáil Debates* 506: 197–198, 15 June 1999) in the 1990s had specifically rejected plans for the WEU–EU merger and the inclusion of alliance obligations in a Treaty, the party merely noted 'aspects of the [draft ESDP provisions in the Defence Working Group 'Barnier'] Report which raise issues for Ireland. These include reference to a mutual assistance or mutual defence clause'. The party stated that this proposal, along with the armaments policy and the lifting of the ban on enhanced cooperation in defence 'will need to be carefully studied' (Roche, 2002). The party's message during the referendum campaign was that Ireland's neutrality is not threatened by the Lisbon Treaty (O'Dea, 2008). Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and Labour campaigned in favour of the treaty (see Quinlan, 2009). Sinn Féin was the only parliamentary party to campaign against the Lisbon Treaty.

Similarly to Sinn Féin, the Green Party had advocated a 'positive' concept of neutrality in their 2007 election manifesto, distinguished from successive governments' definition of non-membership of military alliances. In 2002, the Green Party campaigned against the amendment to the Nice Treaty as having no legal basis, failing to preclude NATO membership, and lacking any mention of a UN mandate for crisis management missions (Boyle, *Dáil Debates* 554: 400–401). Five years later, the Green Party (2007a: 32) pledged to 'remain committed to protecting Irish neutrality from any further moves towards an EU Common Defence Policy or any strengthening of the Common Foreign and Security Policy' and would seek a referendum to define neutrality in the Constitution (2007a: 32). But whereas the Sinn Féin 2007 election manifesto and guide to the Lisbon Treaty showed a consistent support for positive neutrality, by comparison, after having entered into coalition government, the Green Party moved towards a more limited concept of neutrality and maintained official silence on the Lisbon Treaty (after a party membership vote of 63 percent in favour of the treaty failed to reach the required two-thirds majority to formally support the treaty). The Green Party information pack on the Lisbon Treaty (Green Party, 2007b: 5) acknowledged that it 'commits the EU to creating a common defence policy' and allows a military 'inner core' of states to 'deepen defence and military cooperation'.

What explains this shift from resistance to ESDP and protection of positive neutrality to a *de facto* endorsement of EU common defence policy in the Lisbon Treaty referendum? Is it due to 'Europeanization' or an internal party decision to stay in coalition government? The 'supranational relations' influence through membership of the European Green Party (EGP), the exclusive partner to the Green Group in the European Parliament, may have played a role (Laffan & Langan, 2005: 11). The EGP Committee (2007: 3) took a position in favour of the Lisbon Treaty, including its provisions on structured cooperation in defence. In the movement from opposition to coalition government, the influence of collective decision-making in cabinet has meant that the Green Party in Ireland has had to adhere to aspects of policy that go against major issue preferences (Müller-Rommel, 2002: 10–11; Bolleyer & Panke, 2009). The party may escape punishment from their traditional supporters at the polls for this neutrality/ESDP policy shift because party affiliations are not strongly linked to voters' attitudes to neutrality (Devine, 2006: 271).

Conclusion

In the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon referendums, Irish neutrality has consistently emerged as the first or second substantive policy reason behind the public's No votes. Although the government parties can be understood as engaging in a two-level game between the neutrality-supportive Irish public and the European Council demands for a common security and defence policy, the wider question of the dynamics driving the elite-public cleavage remains. Hooghe (2003) explains that elite preferences for the Europeanization of policies (such as foreign, security and defence policies) reflects a functionalist logic and desire for economies of scale, to

achieve their goal of a European Union capable of governing a large, competitive market and projecting political muscle. Citizens, however, are more in favour of 'a caring European Union, which protects them from the vagaries of capitalist markets' and support different aspects of European integration, for example social, cohesion and environmental policies (Hooghe, 2003: 17–18). These different agendas illustrate the wider context in which the local dynamics of Ireland's postcolonial history and the Irish public's adherence to the values embodied in neutrality combine to produce a resistance to Europeanization in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy.

This article has considered the ways in which Irish political parties have attempted to negotiate this two-level tension, as it is exemplified in the debate about Irish neutrality and European common security. A general trend whereby most Irish political parties have moved from support for 'positive'/'active' Irish neutrality to a limited 'military' concept that allows the development of European Security and Defence Policy is clearly discernible. Fianna Fáil copper-fastened its move away from neutrality to embrace a European common defence in the 1970s, Fine Gael converted in the 1980s, Labour took the same steps in the 1990s and the Green Party approximated the move in the 2000s. Presently, the only parliamentary party left supporting Irish neutrality is Sinn Féin. It remains to be seen whether this party will continue to resist the effects of Europeanization that have characterized the most significant movements across the 'Irish neutrality–EU CSDP' policy dimensions in the Irish party system.

In sum, the politicization of Irish neutrality and EU common security and defence policy have effected important party political changes in Ireland. Individual parties have, to differing degrees, modified their positions on both issues. Programmatic change has been especially apparent when judged in terms of evolving party discourse. Such change has been influenced by a combination of domestic and EU influences. Participation in government appears to be an important stimulant for party political change on neutrality and European security and defence policies. Party competition, particularly during referendum campaigns, is similarly significant in prompting modification in party positions. Other forces also important include domestic electoral objectives and agendas. The development of Irish party political attitudes towards neutrality and the evolution of the EU's foreign, security and defence policies have interacted in intricate ways with domestic party political agendas to produce a form of substantive Europeanization through subtle and muted discursive practices.

Notes

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